Empirical work on contracts typically regresses contract choice on observed principal and agent characteristics. If (i) some of these characteristics are unobserved or partially observed, and (ii) there are incentives whereby particular types of agents end up contracting with particular types of principals, estimated coefficients on the observed characteristics may be misleading. We address this endogenous matching problem using a data set on agricultural contracts between landlords and tenants in early Renaissance Tuscany. Controlling for endogenous matching has an impact on parameters of interest and tenants' risk aversion appears to have inßuenced contract choice.
Introduction
Theoretical work on contract choice often starts with a principal with particular characteristics, an agent with particular characteristics, and characteristics of the task to be contracted on. One then proceeds to solve for the optimal contract form (e.g. the share of output to be given to the agent) as a function of these characteristics. Among other things, the implications of factors such as risk aversion, monitoring ability, moral hazard, and multiple tasks on optimal contracts and the second best outcome have been examined (e.g. Mirrlees 1974; Stiglitz 1974; Grossman and Hart 1983; and Holmstrom and Milgrom 1987 , 1994 . 1 Empirical work on contract choice, often in an agrarian or franchising context, usually starts with such equations in mind and proceeds by regressing contract choice on observed principal, agent, and task characteristics. The point of such works is that knowing if, how, or how much certain characteristics affect contract choice can tell us something about which of the above factors are important. This in turn can provide us with valuable information about the functioning of a micro-economy. For example, if risk sharing appears to be an important determinant of contract choice, one might make inferences about the state of insurance markets in an economy. Similarly, measuring the impact of potential capital constraints can shed light on the functioning of capital markets. Such knowledge can be beneÞcial for policy, particularly in the context of economic development.
Much of the empirical literature has focused on testing two possible determinants of contract choice. On one hand, risk sharing models stress that, in the presence of a risk averse agent who can shirk in performing the tasks assigned by the principal, share or royalty contracts offer insurance and, at the same time, provide incentives for the agent to be diligent. On the other hand, transaction-cost models tend to ignore risk preferences and focus on enforcement costs and transaction-speciÞc assets. Interestingly, there seems to be little empirical support of risk sharing as an important determinant of contract choice in either franchising or agriculture. Allen and Lueck (1995, 447) state, Accumulated evidence confronting risk sharing and transaction costscovering such topics as franchising, gold mining, sharecropping, and timberactually favors the transaction-cost framework.
Other empirical work has found support for moral hazard, capital constraints, and multitasking issues as important determinants of contractual arrangements.
1
While the existing empirical literature on the determinants of contract choice is vast and interesting, there is a potential problem with much of the above work that deserves attention. A key dichotomy between the theoretical and empirical literatures is that in the theory literature, there is no measurement problem regarding principal, agent, and task characteristics. In contrast, in the empirical literature there clearly is. Many potentially relevant characteristics may be unobserved, partially observed, or observed with error by an econometrician. This observability problem is often acknowledged or mentioned in passing by the empirical literature, but the implications do not seem to have been fully discussed.
In contrast, we argue that if principals and the agents they contract with are "matched" with each other according to economic variables (and we argue that there are incentives for such endogenous matching), this observability problem is important and casts doubts on estimated coefficients in regressions of contract choice on observed characteristics. 3 More important, we suggest techniques for ameliorating these problems and show that these techniques inßuence estimates in a data set on agrarian contracts. Our ultimate goal is to test various theories of contract choice and to reassess the role of risk sharing.
To exemplify incentives for endogenous matching and its implications, consider Allen and Lueck (1992) who examine whether the inherent riskiness of a crop affects the type of contract used for that crop. Their hypothesis is that if risk-effects are an important determinant of contract choice, then higher risk crops will be more likely to be associated with share contracts rather than Þxed rent contracts. 4 Empirically, they do not Þnd this correlation and conclude that risk sharing is not an important determinant of contract choice.
Consider an alternative explanation of this empirical result where risk sharing is in fact important (e.g. the Holmstrom-Milgrom (1987) model) . Suppose that half the potential tenants in the economy are risk neutral, while the other half are risk averse. Similarly, half the crops are very risky, and half are somewhat less risky. For social welfare it would be best for the risk neutral tenants to work on the very risky crops. If this "endogenous matching" equilibrium were exactly the outcome, the risky crops will be associated with Þxed-rent contracts (because the tenants are risk neutral, the optimal contract is Þxed-rent), while the less risky crops, cultivated by risk averse tenants, would be associated with share contracts. Note that this extreme example gives exactly the reverse empirical implication than that argued by Allen and Lueck-Þxed-rent contracts are found on the Brickley and Dark (1987) , Martin (1988) , Lafontaine (1992) , Lafontaine and Battacharyya (1995) , Slade (1996) , and Lafontaine and Slade (1997) . 3 While there is a large theoretical literature on matching, we know of no papers that address the empirical implications of matching of principals and agents. An insightful paper somewhat related to our work is by Pierre Dubois (2000) that deals with a related endogeneity problem-the endogenous choice of what type of crop to grow on the land. 4 Their maintained assumption is that the type of crop grown on a particular plot of land is Þxed (e.g. due to climate or soil type) and not a choice variable of the landlord. risky crops. The problem here is that while the "riskiness of crop" may be exogenous to the landlord who owns the land, it is endogenous, through principal-agent matching, to the type of tenant attracted to it. 5 If a tenant's risk aversion was perfectly observed by the econometrician, the endogeneity problem would be solved by regressing contract choice on crop riskiness and risk aversion. However, economists rarely profess to exactly observe a tenant's risk aversion. Rather, they use a proxy or proxies for risk aversion such as wealth or property. We show that using proxies for risk aversion in such regressions does not solve the endogenous matching problem. With endogenous matching, the "crop variability" variable will still be correlated with the error term through the proxy error, i.e. the unobserved component of risk aversion.
The above example considered matching based on risk and risk aversion. There are many other stories that suggest matching between heterogeneous principals and agents. For example, principals with more ability to monitor or more ability to measure output (who might relatively prefer low share or high royalty contracts) might end up matching with agents with more risk aversion, more credit constraints, or a higher cost of effort (who might also relatively prefer low share or wage contracts). We argue that any such matching can be a serious problem when one is relying on proxies for relevant variables, which is often the case in the contract choice literature. Put succinctly, the matching generates correlation between observable characteristics of one of the parties and proxy errors of the other party, potentially biasing many or all coefficients of interest.
This article addresses this problem and suggests potential solutions. These solutions involve consideration of a "matching equation" that describes how principals and agents are matched with one another. What we require are instruments that affect the matching equation but do not affect the contractual choice or proxy equations. We suggest and apply the use of geographical based instruments that can affect the matching equation through, e.g., differences in the exogenous distribution of land type across regions. The examination of this matching equation can also provide economically interesting information in its own right.
We apply our techniques to historical data on contracts between landlords and tenants in early Renaissance Tuscany. This is a similar data set to that used by Galassi, Mealli, and Pudney (1999) with the signiÞcant addition of variables measuring tenant characteristics. These tenant variables are important because they enable us to both test for, and econometrically control for, endogenous matching. Comparing our results to a prior article (Ackerberg and Botticini 2000) where we ignored matching, here we Þnd (i) strong evidence of matching between principals and agents, and (ii) that econometrically controlling for the matching can have a fairly large impact on the magnitude and sig-niÞcance of contract choice coefficients. For example, without controlling for matching, there is little if any effect of tenant wealth on contract choice. After controlling for the biases due to endogenous matching, we Þnd a stronger and signiÞcant effect of tenant wealth. Given that wealth proxies for risk aversion, this Þnding suggests that risk sharing is an important determinant of contract choice. 6 In addition to correcting for endogenous matching in our contract choice equations, we also make interesting economic inferences from our estimates of the direction of matching. This direction is consistent with multitasking issues (as in Holmstrom and Milgrom 1991) being an important factor in contract choice.
These empirical results are important for at least a couple of reasons. First, given the lack of evidence of risk sharing in the prior empirical literature, it suggests that prior work may suffer from biases because matching is ignored. Second, although early Renaissance Tuscany was a vibrant economy endowed with sophisticated economic institutions, her agricultural insurance and rural credit markets were either missing or imperfect. This is also the case in many contemporary developing countries. As a result, we think that our Þndings can also provide insights on issues currently debated in the context of developing countries, foremost the role of contractual arrangements in substituting for missing or imperfect insurance and/or capital markets.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 illustrates the endogenous matching problem, section 3 describes the sample, and section 4 presents the empirical results. Section 5 concludes.
IdentiÞcation
Consider a standard moral hazard model in which a principal and an agent are contracting over a task to be done. There is no hidden information, i.e. both parties know the characteristics of their contracting partner. Suppose theory gives us a contract choice equation describing the second best contract y as a function of the characteristics of the principal/task (p) and agent (a):
Examples of p might be the inherent riskiness of the principal's crop or franchise, monitoring ability, risk aversion, or transactions costs. a might measure the agent's risk aversion, productivity, or opportunity cost of effort. The variable y might indicate the share of output or revenue paid to the agent (e.g. royalty rate) or the discrete type of contract used (e.g. wage, share, or Þxed-rent). While this equation might be non-linear, we focus initially on the linear case since this keeps identiÞcation issues as transparent as possible. ² is measurement error or optimization error in y, uncorrelated with a and p. This loses little generality since p and a contain all the characteristics relevant to contract choice and we will allow the possibility that elements of p or a are partially observed or unobserved by the econometrician. In empirical work, characteristics in a and/or p are seldom perfectly observed. For example, an econometrician does not perfectly observe an agent's risk aversion. However, there are often proxies available for these variables (e.g. observed wealth may proxy for unobserved risk aversion). Past empirical work has proceeded by substituting these proxies into (1) for the true variables and using standard estimation techniques (e.g. OLS). We argue that such a procedure is problematic when there is "matching" of heterogeneous principals and agents in a microeconomy, i.e. when there are incentives for certain types of agents to match (contract) with certain types of principals.
In an economy with heterogeneous principals and agents, there are likely to be strong incentives for such matching. For example, suppose agents differ in their level of risk aversion and principals differ in the level of riskiness of the task they are contracting out. One might expect the less risk averse agents to "match" with the more risky principals/tasks, as these agents can more easily bear the risk. It is fairly easy to construct examples in which this is the only "matching" equilibrium of a simple economy. 7 There are other possible matching stories, e.g. agents with high productivity levels might match with principals with low levels of monitoring ability, as they both relatively prefer high incentive contracts. Here we do not investigate exactly how this matching is occurring (see, e.g. Shimer and Smith (1996) or Legros and Newman (1998) for recent theoretical models of matching with contracting). What we do address are the implications of such matching for empirical work when relevant principal or agent characteristics are only partially observed.
Consider the simplest possible case where p and a are scalars and p is perfectly observed by the econometrician. The agent characteristic a is not fully observed, but one observes a proxy w for it. Suppose the proxy relationship is given by a = θw + η with η mean independent of w.
8 Substituting this into the contract choice equation gives us:
The goal of the empirical exercise is to estimate the coefficient β 1 and the product β 2 θ. Again considering the simplest possible case, suppose that principals and agents match according to the following linear matching equation:
where ν is "matching error" (caused, e.g., by frictions in a search process). Note that without ν, estimating β 1 and β 2 θ would be hopeless as p and w would be collinear. Given this matching, it is clear that simple OLS estimation of (2) is problematic. Because of matching, the principal's characteristic p will typically be correlated with the unobserved component of the agent's characteristic, η. As a result, p will be correlated with the econometric error term (β 2 η + ²) in (2). This both directly biases the estimate of β 1 and indirectly biases the estimate of β 2 θ (as the matching equation implies p and w are correlated).
We suggest potential solutions to this endogenous matching problem. The Þrst relies on instrumental variables. What we need is an instrument z that inßuences matching but does not enter the contract choice or proxy equations. In other words, we want an instrument that exogenously shifts the type of principal an agent gets matched with. One might use characteristics of a tenant that appear to affect matching but can reasonably be excluded from entering the contract choice equation.
More interesting and general is the case where observations come from different geographical or temporal markets. If the population distribution of observable principal or agent characteristics (e.g. the distribution of p or w) differ across these markets, the matching equation should differ across markets. Consider two geographically distinct markets, each with the same distribution of a but the second market having a higher mean of the p distribution. Then for a given a, an agent in the second market will tend to get matched with a principal with a higher p. While different means of these characteristic distributions generate differences in the intercept term of matching equations, different variances of these distributions will tend to generate different slope coefficients. If, for example, all jobs in the second market have the same level of riskiness, the slope coefficient in the second market will be zero.
If the matching equations varies across markets, we have two sets of potential instruments for the endogenous p-(i) market dummies, and (ii) market dummies interacted with w. The question is whether these instruments can reasonably be excluded from the other equations in the system. First, consider the structural contract choice equation, which speciÞes optimal contractual form as a function of all the fundamental economic characteristics of the principal and agent. As there is neither a compelling argument to think nor a model to suggest that market of residence is one of these fundamental characteristics, these market variables can be excluded virtually by deÞnition. This is a bit misleading as some of the fundamental characteristics (p or a) might be "endogenous" to the market the actors are in. For instance, in a matching equilib-rium, reservation utilities of principals and agents might be endogenously determined and vary across markets. These different reservation utilities could generate different transfer payments to the "same" agents across different markets. A problem arises if these differences in transfer payments indirectly affect the optimal contract choice y through income effects-i.e. transfer payments affect the tenant's "net" wealth, in turn affecting their risk aversion, in turn affecting the optimal contract choice. Many models do not have this income effect (e.g. in the Holmstrom and Milgrom moral hazard model the agent's risk aversion is not affected by the transfer payment). This should also be the case in other CARA (constant absolute risk aversion) models. Even in more general models, we feel that these income effects should be small and unlikely to cause signiÞcant problems.
Secondly, we need to assume that these market-based instruments do not enter the proxy equation. For this to be true, the markets must be as isolated as possible. Migration based on economic considerations is a problem if agents move to markets where payoffs to their characteristics are high. While these assumptions may not always hold, they are on the same level as those in a standard proxy problem, i.e. that the proxy errors are uncorrelated with other assumed exogenous variables in the model. Essentially, while we are allowing an agent to match with principals within a market endogenously, we are assuming that the market the agent is in is exogenous. 9 A second econometric approach to addressing the endogenous matching problem is through examining covariances. The basic idea is that the observed correlation between p and w can inform us about the direction of the unobserved correlation between p and η. This can enable one to sign the biases in the contract choice equation. The primary caveat of this approach is the assumption that other unobservables in the model are uncorrelated with each other and the exogenous variables in the model, i.e. η needs to be the only source of endogeneity. This covariance argument brings up an important point regarding the "Þrst-stage" regression in the IV solution. Examination of this regression is of interest to determine whether one has signiÞcant instruments. But suppose one Þnds no signiÞcant correlation between observed agent and principal characteristics. While this may rule out some potential instruments, it may also suggest that there may be no matching and thus no endogeneity problem. Clearly, a Þrst step with this type of data is to examine correlations between principal and agent characteristics.
A third potential approach is to use "panel" data. If the same principal contracts with multiple agents (or the reverse) and unobserved characteristics are constant across these contracts, panel techniques can eliminate the endogeneity problem. In our empiri-cal work, we use this strategy to accommodate potential observability problems with p. This addresses a "two-sided" matching problem, i.e. where unobserved principal characteristics may be correlated with observed agent characteristics, and unobserved agent characteristics may be correlated with observed principal characteristics.
Data

The Sample
We examine matching and its implications on contract choice equations in an interesting historical data set on agrarian contracts gathered from the Florentine catasto of 1427, a comprehensive census and property survey of Tuscany. The sample consists of landlords living in the Tuscan towns of Florence, Pescia, and San Gimignano, and their tenants who lived in many villages in the countryside. Landlords often contracted with more than one tenant-the data consists of 902 land plots/contracts owned by 128 landlords. 10 For a thorough description of the data, see Ackerberg and Botticini (2000) . Our primary variables of interest are (i) the crop type grown on the land to be cultivated, (ii) the wealth of the tenant, and (iii) the type of contract used. The countrysides of these towns were isolated from each other economically and migration rates were fairly low: three percent of peasant households living in the countryside of Florence declared to have emigrated from other Tuscan towns or from other places. The corresponding percentages for San Gimignano and Pescia were six and 13 percent, respectively. In light of the discussion in section 2, this separation is important as it justiÞes the choice of "towns" as potential instruments in the estimation.
The sample contains both share and Þxed-rent contracts. Although the data does not often give information on exact shares, most were 50/50. 11 The crop type on a particular land plot was classiÞed as "vines," "cereals," or "mixed," depending on whether vines (or other perennial crops), cereals (or other annual crops), or both types of crops were grown. 12 10 To ease data collection, we oversampled wealthier landlords (who were more likely to lease their land plots out). We set our sampling criterion such that approx. 85 percent of plots under contract in each town were potentially in the sample. This large percentage should minimize selection problems, although our landlord Þxed effects speciÞcations should also control for selection. These Þxed effect models should also somewhat control for a related selection problem, that we did not include landlords who cultivated their own land in the sample. 11 As often the case with data on contracts, the preponderance of a few particular contracts does not completely coincide with the theoretical literature that predicts a wide range of shares (or non-linear contracts). One argument is to appeal to institutional restrictions that limit the "optimal" choice to the optimum from a small set of commonly used contracts. 12 The nature of the land on a farm partly determined the crops to be planted (hills were better for vines, valleys for cereals). In addition, vines are long lived plants so it would not be easy to switch crops 8 The distinction between cereals and vines is relevant for both the risk sharing hypothesis and the multitasking model of Holmstrom and Milgrom (1991) . First, while cereals were subject to weather variability, vines were much more sensitive (Galassi 2000) . As such, all else equal one might expect vines to be more likely to be associated with share contracts rather than Þxed-rent contracts. Second, vines had interesting multitasking features. Tenant's effort could be devoted to maximizing current production, or to maintaining and improving the assets for future production. Peasant tenants could boost current production by pruning in a certain way or putting manure near the roots. However, this could damage the vines and result in less output in subsequent years (Hoffman 1984) . Thus, owners of land plots with vines might be hesitant to sign contracts with strong incentives for current production (i.e. Þxed-rent contracts). 13 Both the multitasking and risk sharing effects of vines suggest similar outcomesÞxed-rent contracts should be less likely with vines. As including the crop type alone is not a conclusive test of the risk sharing hypothesis, we also consider the tenant's wealth as a potential proxy for his risk aversion (as, e.g., Laffont and Matoussi). If risk aversion is an important determinant of contract form and wealth is a valid proxy for risk aversion, wealthier tenants should be more likely to engage in Þxed-rent contracts. Table 1 presents summary statistics of the variables. The four cross-tabulations in Table  2 (for the aggregate and for the three towns individually) illustrate three interesting correlations that hold in both the aggregate and at the town level. First, land plots with vines (and other perennial crops) appear to be associated with share contracts, while land plots with cereals (and other annual crops) were most often leased out under Þxed-rent contracts. Out of 902 observations, 482 land plots with vines or mixed crops were share cropped, and 28 were leased out to Þxed-rent tenants. As for land plots with cereals, 83 were share cropped and 309 were leased out to Þxed-rent tenants. Second, looking across contracts for a given crop type, mean tenant's wealth is higher under Þxed-rent contracts than share contracts. Third, Table 2 indicates correlation between a tenant's wealth and the type of crop they were cultivating. Poorer tenants primarily cultivated land plots with vines only or farms with vines and cereals. Wealthier tenants mainly cultivated plots with cereals only. This last correlation is suggestive of matching between landlords and tenants: tenants with certain characteristics appear to be matched with speciÞc crops.
Summary Statistics
in the short term. Thus, it is reasonable to think that the type of crop grown was exogenous to the land and landowner. However, since we end up modelling crop type as endogenous anyway (due to endogenous matching), this assumption is not completely necessary. 13 Though we do not have any data on contract length for Tuscan agriculture, there is evidence that in nineteenth-century Sicily perennial crops, such as vines, were more likely to be leased out with contracts longer than one year (Bandiera 1998 ). This also seems supportive of multitasking.
The distribution of land types was very different across towns. In Pescia, 75 percent of land plots had cereals only, very few had both cereals and vines, and the rest (20 percent) were plots with vines only. In San Gimignano, 85 percent of land plots had both cereals and vines, 10 percent had cereals only, and 5 percent had vines only. Florence was somewhat in between, with 55 percent of the plots containing mixed crops, 38 percent cereals only, and 8 percent vines only. These differences in land distributions give exogenous variation in crop type that can help control for endogenous matching.
Empirical Results
We present two sets of empirical results. The Þrst are linear models similar to those discussed in section 2. While there is a considerable amount of discreteness in our data (type of land, type of contract), the linear models make identiÞcation issues transparent. We then turn to non-linear models that are more appropriate given the data. Since sources of identiÞcation are less clear in these non-linear models, we devote a section to addressing the issue.
Linear Models
Naive Contract Choice Equations Our Þrst econometric take on the data is to estimate simple contract choice equations, ignoring the possibility of matching and subsequent endogeneity problems. Column 1 of Table 3 presents results of a linear probability regression of contract choice (0=share, 1=Þxed rent) on town dummies, tenant wealth, and a crop type variable crop (=0 if cereals, =0.5 if mixed, =1 if vines). Our results are robust to alternative deÞnitions of the crop variable.
14 The results conÞrm the casual evidence of Table 2 : moving from cereals to mixed crops to vines appears to decrease the probability of Þxed-rent contracts, while increases in tenant wealth raises the likelihood of Þxed-rent contracts. The negative coefficient on crop might either (i) suggest that vines are more risky and thus more likely to be leased out under share contracts, or (ii) support a multitasking argument that landlords are hesitant to use incentive laden contracts on perennial crops. If wealth is a good proxy for risk aversion, the positive coefficient would seem to lend some support to the risk sharing hypothesis. Foreshadowing our second set of estimates, Column 3 repeats the analysis with a more appealing probit model of contract choice-again crop is very signiÞcant.
Columns 2 and 4 run the same models using only the data for Pescia and San Gimignano. There are a couple of reasons for this estimation strategy. Florence was considerably different from the other two towns. Not only was it much bigger in both size and population, but it was also the commercial center of Tuscany. Moreover, as shown by the estimates, there do appear to be differences, particularly in the coefficient on wealth. This coefficient is considerably smaller than the one in the regression with the full sample, not statistically signiÞcant in the probit model, and marginally signiÞcant in the linear probability model. 15 Thus, while the effect of crop on contract choice seems very strong regardless of speciÞcation, support for the risk sharing hypothesis through the wealth variable is mixed, particularly in Pescia and San Gimignano.
Columns 5 and 6 obtain similar results with linear Þxed effect models. These speciÞca-tions allow for unobserved variables that are constant for a given landlord (e.g. differences in monitoring or transactions costs) and might be correlated with crop or wealth.
Matching Equations
We now consider the possibility of endogenous principal-agent matching. In our case, particular concern arises from the realization that tenant's wealth is probably not a perfect proxy for tenant risk's aversion. If tenants match with landlords based on an unobserved component of risk aversion, the coefficients in Table 3 on both crop and wealth will be biased. For the moment, assume that landlords have only one relevant characteristic-land type-and this land type is perfectly observed by us as econometricians.
As suggested in section 2, a Þrst step towards assessing potential matching problems is to examine correlations between observable principal and agent characteristics. Column 1 of Table 4 addresses this question by regressing crop on town dummies and tenant wealth. The results conÞrm the correlations in Table 2 in that they show a very strong, signiÞcant, negative relation between the two variables, i.e. it is the less wealthy tenants that appear to end up on vines.
At the very least, this regression suggests that there is matching between principals and agents. It does not tell us why there is such matching, although with more heroic assumptions one can draw more inferences from this negative relationship. On the one hand, if risk effects were very important and vines were considerably more risky than cereals, one might expect the reverse relationship, i.e. less risk averse tenants ending up on more risky crops. On the other hand, a multitasking story (with little or no difference in the riskiness of crops) might suggest that more risk averse tenants end up on vines. The intuition is that, all else equal, both landlords owning vines and very risk averse tenants relatively prefer share contracts. These two arguments suggest that under the hypothesis that matching can only be caused by risk issues or multitasking, the negative relation in the data might be more supportive of multitasking. Of course, this argument needs to assume away any other potential reasons for matching, e.g. less wealthy tenants like wine, or that there are other economic reasons why less wealthy tenants would prefer to cultivate vines.
A second inference we can make from the estimated direction of matching is the direction of the biases in the contract choice equation. Since crop is negatively correlated with the observed component of risk aversion (wealth), it should also be negatively correlated with the unobserved component of risk aversion. This imparts negative bias on the crop coefficient. In addition, the coefficient on wealth will be biased towards zero (see Ackerberg and Botticini (1999) for details). Interestingly, these inferences are consistent with the OLS biases uncovered in the IV results below.
Linear IV Models Given the apparent existence of matching and the resulting endogeneity of crop, section 2 suggests the possibility of instrumenting using cross-region differences in the matching equation. The intuition is that signiÞcant such differences will provide instruments for the crop variable. With this method there is no need to make assumptions about the causes of matching.
For the validity of the IV approach, the coefficients on both crop type (crop) and risk aversion (wealth) in the contract choice equation need to be assumed identical across towns. The main intuition behind this exclusion restriction is theoretical (section 2). Theory predicts that contract choice should be a function of the fundamental characteristics of the principal and the agent, not of the market of residence. In other words, if one considers an agent with risk aversion a and a principal with crop type p, they agree on the same optimal contract regardless of the town they are living in.
While this assumption may be intuitive, it is not without potential problems. One might worry that there are fundamental differences across towns that affect the contracting environment. One example would be if crops behaved differently across towns (e.g. because of weather, soil, or different types of grapes). If this were the case, the dummy variable crop might have a different effect on contract choice across towns, invalidating our exclusion restriction. Fortunately, we have some evidence that this may not be the case. Tuscany has been divided into Þve topographical areas (Biagioli 1975, 273-80) : inland mountains, coastal mountains, inland hills, coastal hills, and valleys. The countryside of Florence, Pescia, and San Gimignano all belong to the "inland hills" group. As for climatic conditions, the area in which the three towns are located is homogenous with regards to temperature and rainfall (Almagia 1959, vol. I, 411-26).
Another potential problem may arise from the possibility that there are fundamental differences in the economic environment in the towns. For example, Florence, with its size and status as a commercial center, might have had better insurance or capital markets than the two smaller towns. We consider samples both with and without Florence to address this issue-one might be more inclined to believe that our identiÞcation restriction holds across the two smaller, more similar, towns. We have no casual evidence of signiÞcant differences between San Gimignano and Pescia. In fact, the size of their popu-lations was very similar (in the 1427 catasto, 532 and 576 households lived in Pescia and in San Gimignano, respectively), had similar distances from Florence, and had similar credit markets (Botticini 2000) . However, it is hard to argue this point conclusively. 16 Column 2 of Table 4 assesses whether there are differences in the matching equation across towns by allowing regional differences in both the intercept and slope coefficients. Though there is a signiÞcant difference in constant terms, our allowance of either landlord Þxed effects or regional dummies in the contract choice equation means that these differences are not helpful as instruments. More important for our purposes are differences in the matching function slope coefficients. γ Columns 3 and 4 contain linear IV results for the full sample and the Pescia-San Gimignano sample, respectively. Columns 5 and 6 are IV Þxed effects models. These IV Þxed effects models allow for two-sided matching to the extent that landlord's unobservables are constant across different tenants. This might be the case if landlords differed in unobserved monitoring or transactions costs or if their owned land plots nearby each other and similar in unobserved characteristics.
A comparison of the IV results in Table 4 to the corresponding OLS results in Table  3 shows a number of differences. In all cases the crop coefficient becomes smaller and considerably less signiÞcant. Similarly, in all cases the wealth coefficient increases in magnitude. These changes are most apparent in the least restrictive speciÞcation, the Þxed effect model with the Pescia-San Gimignano data (Column 6). 17 Comparing these estimates to their OLS analog (Table 3 -Column 6) the estimated coefficient on wealth more than doubles (from 0.0242 to 0.0530) and moves from borderline signiÞcance (one sided p-value of 0.0447) to clear signiÞcance (p-value = 0.0048). Note that the differences between the OLS and IV results are indicative of negative correlation between the errors in the contract choice and matching equations. Given the signs of the γ 1 's (-) and β 2 16 Recall we also need the proxy relationship between wealth and risk aversion to have the same slope across towns, i.e. augmenting wealth by 1 ßorin has the same effect on risk aversion regardless of the town the tenant lives in. Given our inclusion of either landlord Þxed effects or region dummy constants in the contract choice equation, it is not essential that the proxy relationship have the same mean across markets. Any differences will be picked up by the Þxed effects or the constants. It is also not necessary for the unobserved component of risk aversion to have the same variance across markets. 17 This is the least restrictive speciÞcation since it does not assume that the contracting environment is the same in San Gimignano and Pescia as it is in Florence; it also allows for unobserved landlord characteristics. With the sub-sample, there are no overidentifying restrictions. With the full sample, we were able to use overidentifying restrictions to reject the hypothesis that Florence is the same as the other two towns (p-value 0.001), but we were unable to reject the hypothesis that San Gimignano and Pescia have the same slope coefficients (p-values 0.171 and 0.339).
(+), this negative correlation is consistent with an unobserved component of risk aversion entering both these error terms.
In summary, the linear models suggest that (i) there is matching, and (ii) controlling for this matching does make a difference. Particularly in the Pescia-San Gimignano sample, the OLS estimates overestimate the effect of crop and underestimate the effect of wealth, both in value and particularly in statistical signiÞcance.
Nonlinear Models FIML Models
The linear IV models ignore a considerable amount of discreteness in the model. The contract variable is one of two discrete types, while land type (crop) is of three discrete types. To control for endogenous matching accommodating these nonlinearities, we need to consider the full system of equations. Assume that contract choice is given by the probit:
and the matching equation is given by the ordered probit:
where k indexes the 3 (or 2) different towns.
A few remarks are in order. First, both the slopes (γ k 1 ) and cutoffs (C k and C k ) in the ordered probit matching equation are allowed to depend on town k. Because of the discrete nature of the processes, the variances of the assumed normal unobservables ² 1 i and ² 2 i need to be normalized to one, but we estimate a correlation coefficient between the two unobservables. This correlation is particularly important to accommodate because at the very least, both ² 1 i and ² 2 i include the unobserved component of tenant's risk aversion. Second, the "ordered" variable v i ,not the latent variable determining v i , enters the contract choice equation. This corresponds with our interpretation that it is the discrete move from vines to cereals that has an effect on contract choice.
For these FIML models we focus on the Pescia-San Gimignano data set, both because it relies on less identifying restrictions and because this is where controlling for matching makes the largest difference. Column 1 of Table 5 re-estimates the naive probit contract choice equation ignoring the endogeneity of crop-β 1 is very signiÞcant, but β 2 is not. Column 2 presents results of the ordered probit matching equation estimated independently. Both the upper and lower cutoffs and the coefficient on wealth in the ordered probit differ signiÞcantly across towns. This suggests that we do have potential instruments for v i .
Column 3 estimates the full model, allowing for correlation between the error terms. The pattern is very similar to the linear models, if not a bit more dramatic. The estimate of β 1 more than halves and becomes insigniÞcant, while the estimate of β 2 almost doubles and becomes signiÞcant. The correlation term is negative and signiÞcant-consistent with an unobserved component of risk aversion. Again, while the naive estimates indicate that the effect of crop is the strongest statistical relation in the data, controlling for endogenous matching suggests that the wealth effect predominates.
IdentiÞcation Caveats and Robustness
The intuition behind the FIML estimates in Column 3 in Table 5 is the same as in the linear models. We want cross-region differences in the matching equation to identify the contract choice equation. Interestingly, there are additional, perhaps unwanted, sources of identiÞcation in the full model. These arise from the inherent non-linearities in the structural matching equation. In a linear model with no instruments, it is impossible to distinguish the direct effect of w i on the contract variable y *
versus the indirect effect of w i through v i . In contrast, in the above non-linear matching model, the direct effect of w i on y * i is still assumed linear, but the indirect effect, i.e. E [β 1 v i | w i ] is non-linear through the ordered probit structure. Hence, the system of (4) and (5) will generally be "identiÞed" even without standard instruments. However, we would not describe this as "good" identiÞcation, as it is not robust to alternative functional forms for w i in the contract choice equation. As such, we want to be careful in assessing what is telling us what about β 1 and β 2 .
One way to separate what the "good" instruments are telling us from what the "bad" ones are, would be to allow w i to directly enter the contract choice equation nonparametrically. As this would be taxing on our data, we take an alternative approach. We include w i in the contract choice equation in a very particular non-linear way-speciÞcally one that imitates w i 's non-linear effect through v i . Consider the function:
where the E are expected values of the town dummy instruments (e.g. Eγ 
will not be identiÞed if the matching equation does not depend on region.
Column 4 presents estimates of this model. The coefficient on crop is now signiÞcant and θ is positive and signiÞcant. Note that the overall effect of wealth on contract choice in this model is a combination of the linear term β 2 , which is positive, and the non-linear 15 term θ, which ends up being negative since wealth has a negative effect on OP (w i , ² 2 i ). The overall effect ends up positive and very signiÞcant (signiÞcance was computed by bootstrapping). We conclude that the insigniÞcant coefficient on crop in Column 3 may be misleading through contamination with some non-robust sources of identiÞcation. When we allow for endogenous matching and utilize only good sources of identiÞcation, both crop and wealth appear statistically signiÞcant.
Conclusions
We have the potential to learn a great deal about markets and economies by studying the determinants of contractual arrangements between parties. For example, empirical evidence on these arrangements can shed light on the functioning of insurance markets, capital markets, or the signiÞcance of moral hazard. There has been a great deal of recent empirical work looking at such issues in a wide range of contexts-from historical data, to agriculture in developing countries, to franchising and agriculture in the contemporary U.S.
This article introduces issues that suggest care in these endeavors. We focus on the empirical implications of potential matching of heterogeneous principals and agents. We argue that there are economic incentives for such matching, and show that when there are econometrically unobserved or partially observed characteristics, this matching is problematic for estimates of optimal contract choice equations.
We then suggest potential solutions for these problems. These solutions revolve around consideration of a matching equation describing how principals and agents match. At the very least, the solutions suggest that a very relevant correlation to examine is the one between the characteristics of the contracting parties. Not only can the examination of these "matching equations" solve problems in contract choice equations, but it can also provide interesting economic insight on their own.
Consideration of these matching equations also points towards future work. If one is willing to make assumptions on the process through which principals and agents match with each other, one can start with basic economic primitives (e.g. utility and production functions) and build a fully speciÞed model of both matching and contract choice. Such a model would more fully exploit the interesting information contained in the way principals and agents match.
In the empirical work, we apply our techniques to a historical data set on agricultural contracts between landlords and tenants in three towns and the villages in their respective countryside in early Renaissance Tuscany. We look for potential evidence of risk sharing, and of multitasking issues arising from the perennial nature of some of the crops. We Þnd a number of interesting empirical results. First, there is very strong evidence that particular types of tenants matched with particular types of landlords. Second, naive estimates ignoring this matching can give misleading results. In our least restrictive speciÞcations, controlling for endogenous matching more than doubles one of the parameters of interest and calls into doubt the very strong signiÞcance of the other. Lastly, we end up with some interesting economic conclusions. While most of the literature has not found signiÞcant evidence of risk sharing, we do Þnd evidence for risk sharing between landlords and tenants in early Renaissance Tuscany. We also Þnd some evidence that multitasking issues played a role in contractual choice on perennial crops.
These Þndings are interesting from both a historical point of view and in the context of developing countries. Historians have debated why share contracts were a predominant agrarian arrangements in medieval Tuscany, early modern France and Spain, and the postbellum U.S. South. At least for medieval Tuscany, we can argue that both risk sharing considerations and multitasking features of medieval viticulture had an impact on the spread of share contracts. In the absence of insurance markets, share contracts seem to have provided an insurance mechanism for tenants while at the same time giving incentives not to overproduce and damage the perennial crops. Given that some contemporary developing countries have some similar attributes, e.g. imperfect insurance or capital markets, the Þndings of this paper have the potential of providing interesting insights on current policy debates on the role of agrarian arrangements in these countries. Table 1 . NOTE.-The dependent variable is a contract choice dummy equal to 0 if the contract chosen is a share contract and equal to 1 if the contract is a Þxed-rent contract. Bootstrapped standard errors are in Þrst parenthesis, bootstrapped p-values in second parenthesis. Superscripts indicate town-speciÞc coefficients (P = Pescia, S = San Gimignano, F = Florence). Column 1 presents results of a linear probability regression of contract choice on town dummies, tenant wealth, and a crop type variable crop (=0 if only cereals are grown, =0.5 if both cereals and vines are grown, =1 if only vines are planted; alternatives speciÞcations for the variable crop were tried as explained in footnote 14). Column 3 uses the same variables and runs a probit regression. Columns 2 and 4 run the same models using only the data for Pescia and San Gimignano. 
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Matching equation Table 1. NOTE.-In columns 1 and 2, the dependent variable is the crop choice (=0 if only cereals are grown, =0.5 if both vines and cereals are grown, =1 if only vines are planted). In columns 3-7, the dependent variable is the contract choice (=0 if share contract, =1 if Þxed-rent contract). Column 1 regresses crop choice on town dummies and tenant wealth. Column 2 assesses whether there are differences in the matching equation across towns by allowing regional differences in both the intercept and slope coefficients. Bootstrapped p-values for the signiÞcance of the differences of the γ 1 's coefficients are: 0.001 for γ Gimignano sample, respectively. Columns 5 and 6 are IV Þxed effects models. These IV Þxed effects models allow for two-sided matching to the extent that landlord's unobservables are constant across different tenants. This might be the case if landlords differed in unobserved monitoring or transactions costs or if their owned land plots nearby each other and similar in unobserved characteristics. 
